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Abstract. 
 
Sir John Vickers (Chairman of the UK’s Independent Commission on Banking 
(2011)), published a discussion paper  entitled “Some Economics of Banking 
Reform” (Vickers (2012)). This is my contribution to the “discussion”, that is, I make 
some criticisms of the paper. The Independent Commission on Banking is referred to 
as the “Vickers commission” below, while the word “Vickers” (without an 
accompanying date) refers to his 2012 discussion paper. 
Two central points in Vickers’s paper are addressed here. First Vickers defends the 
existing banking system partially on the grounds that it engages in “borrow short and 
lend long”,  i.e. “maturity transformation” (MT), which Vickers claims brings a large 
benefit. Vickers makes the standard claim for MT, namely that depositors gain the 
additional interest that comes from having their money invested in long term loans or 
investments while still retaining quick access to their money, i.e. liquidity.  One flaw 
in that argument is that MT involves risk, a risk which went wrong around five years 
ago and would have crashed the world economy far more seriously than it actually 
did, had banks not been rescued with trillions of dollars of public money. 
A second  flaw in MT is that if it is curtailed, the resulting reduced quantity of money / 
liquidity can be made good at zero real cost by having central banks issue more 
money. And that involves no risk of the bank runs, credit crunches and so on that are 
inherent to MT. Thus the case for MT is badly flawed. 
The second central point addressed below, in Part II, is Vickers’s claim that full 
reserve banking or “narrow banking” as he calls it, is defective.  
The paragraphs below are not supposed to be a REVIEW of Vickers’s paper: to 
repeat, it is just the above two points made in the paper which are considered here. 
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That is, there are various parts of Vickers’s paper which I agree with, or which I am 
not qualified to judge. 
__________ 
Part I. Maturity Transformation. 
 
As pointed out in the abstract above, Vickers defends an aspect of the existing 
banking system, namely that it engages in MT. Whether the phrase “existing banking 
system” is taken to mean the existing system enhanced by Vickers’s ring fence 
proposals or not does not greatly matter because it is MT as such which is 
discussed here. 
On p.5 Vickers advocates MT. He says:  “banks engage in maturity transformation 
insofar as they ‘borrow short but lend long’. This brings huge efficiency benefits…..It 
is efficient because it reconciles the freedom for depositors to meet their short-term 
liquidity needs with the financing of long-term lending both to households (e.g. 
residential mortgages) and for corporate investment.” 
To rephrase that quote, when people deposit money at commercial banks and banks 
lend on that money to mortgagors and so on, depositors can have instant access to 
their money (i.e. liquidity of a sort) while they also share in the benefits of the 
relatively high interest rates that are earned from making long term loans. 
(Incidentally, any readers who think that banks simply lend out money they’ve 
created out of thin air, and do not in any sense act as intermediaries between 
lenders and borrowers, please see this article. Commercial banks actually perform 
BOTH activities: create fresh money AND ACT as intermediaries.) 
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However, loans can be funded not entirely from deposits but also, to a greater or 
lesser degree, via shareholders. For example in contrast to the 3% or so capital ratio 
that was common before the recent crisis, Martin Wolf advocates a 25% or so capital 
ratio (Wolf (2012)). And under Laurence Kotlikoff’s version of full reserve banking 
(FR), loans are funded ENTIRELY by shareholders (effectively a 100% ratio). Or to 
be more accurate, under Kotlikoff’s version of FR, loans are funded by people who 
buy into mutual funds (“unit trusts” in the UK), but those people amount to 
shareholders. (Klein (2013) gives a good summary of Kotlikoff’s version of FR). 
In the latter sort of scenarios there is clearly less MT. That is, there is a loss of 
liquidity, i.e. the money supply would contract. (For the exact reasons, see endnote 
3). But that would be no problem because it would cost nothing in real terms to 
supply the economy with extra money: the central bank could just create new base 
money and spend it into the economy, and/or cut taxes.  As Milton Friedman (1960, 
Ch3) put it in reference to base money, “It need cost society essentially nothing in 
real resources to provide the individual with the current services of an additional 
dollar in cash balances.” 
Incidentally, even if there were no central banks, and savers who funded loans had 
to lock up their money for extended periods, COMMERCIAL BANKS would actually 
be able to make good the resulting loss of liquidity. (For more on that, see endnote 1 
below). 
To summarise this section, intermediaries that connect savers and borrowers make 
sense in that lending requires various skills, including legal skills. However, making 
the relevant savers’ investment highly liquid (aka MT) is totally unnecessary, 
because central banks (at zero cost) can issue whatever amount of liquidity / cash is 
needed to keep the economy operating at capacity or full employment (aka NAIRU).  
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Having depositors fund lenders means bank fragility. 
 
Moreover, there is a serious problem involved in having commercial banks (or more 
generally “lending entities”) funded by depositors: depositors can withdraw their 
money on demand or at short notice, and if depositors withdraw too much, the 
relevant bank is insolvent. 
For example, if a bank is funded about 3% by capital and about 97% by deposits or 
other debt (which was common prior to the recent crisis), the value of the loans 
made by a bank only has to fall by slightly more than 3% (e.g. when it is discovered 
that incompetent loans have been made), and the bank is technically insolvent. And 
if faith in the bank is lost, a bank run starts, leading to ACTUALLY insolvency.  
That system is defective, to put it mildly. And it’s not just the recent crisis that 
demonstrated that the existing system is defective. According to Robert Peston 
(2012, Ch1) various large UK banks were in dire straits in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. 
There has to be a better way to run a railroad. 
And as distinct from depositors, funding loans via bonds and loans from the 
wholesale money market poses an equally serious problem (as Northern Rock 
discovered). Loans from the wholesale market amount to little more than very big 
depositors.  
As to bonds, they have in common with deposits the fact that they represent a 
liability which (on maturity) is fixed in value (inflation apart), though repayment i.e. 
“maturity” may not be for several years. (That is as distinct from shares which have 
no fixed value). 
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Commercial banks cannot give us liquidity without fragility. 
 
In short, there is a big problem with commercial bank provided MT or liquidity, which 
is that that method of liquidity or money creation gives us fragile banks and worse: 
bank runs, and credit crunches as a side effect. 
Indeed, the latter point was made by Douglas Diamond (1999). In his abstract and in 
reference to the liquidity producing characteristics of commercial banks he says, “We 
show the bank has to have a fragile capital structure, subject to bank runs, in order 
to perform these functions.” And Vickers himself  says “Banking, including retail 
banking, is inherently risky.” 
To summarise so far, the “huge efficiency benefits” of MT to which Vickers referred 
in the above quote are beginning to look unimpressive. 
 
Decent capital ratios and government guarantees. 
 
Of course the latter fragility can be reduced by requiring banks to have decent capital 
ratios and/or having government stand behind private banks. But the problem with 
having government stand behind private banks (e.g. offer the “lender of last resort” 
facility or deposit guarantees) is that in practice that usually amounts to a subsidy of 
private banks. IN THEORY, those types of support for banks need not amount to a 
subsidy, but in practice, and because of political pressures, they normally do amount 
to subsidies. (Politicians always prefer quickly papering over cracks to implementing 
fundamental reforms).  And as it explains in the introductory economics text books, 
subsidies misallocate resources and reduce GDP (unless there are very good social 
reasons for subsidies, as is the case for example with children’s education). Or as 
7 
 
 
the Vickers commission final report put it “The risks inevitably associated with 
banking have to sit somewhere, and it should not be with taxpayers”. 
But lender of last resort (LOLR), deposit guarantees, etc do not really influence the 
argument here and for the following reasons. If those types of support for banks are 
in fact subsidies, they misallocate resources and are unjustified. But if they are not 
subsidies, then they are compatible with the arguments put here, namely that banks 
should be treated like any other business: that is, no special favours should be 
extended to banks by governments (i.e. taxpayers). 
A further weakness in LOLR is thus. Walter Bagehot is often said to have given his 
blessing to it. Indeed Vickers cites Bagehot in support of LOLR. In fact Walter 
Bagehot did not approve of LOLR. In the last chapter of his book “Lombard Street” 
he said he did not intend opposing it because he thought it was so entrenched that it 
would be near impossible to remove.  
 
Deposit insurance is flawed. 
 
As to deposit insurance, clearly if that is funded by taxpayers, it amounts (to repeat) 
to a subsidy of banking, which does not make economic sense. But deposit 
insurance does not actually make much sense even when it is funded by depositors 
and for the following reasons. (Incidentally it might seem that deposit insurance of 
the self-funding FDIC type in the US is paid for by banks, not depositors. In fact any 
payment made by a corporation, if it calculates its costs correctly will be debited to 
the people or products that occasion that payment.) 
Suppose a bank is funded entirely or almost entirely by depositors (to take the 
extreme case), and suppose the risk of their being wiped out is 1%pa. Obviously the 
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appropriate insurance premium will be 1%pa of total deposits. But suppose instead, 
all those depositors had been shareholders. The chance of their being wiped out 
would be exactly the same (assuming the bank funds the same set of mortgages and 
other loans). Thus the return that depositors and shareholders would want in respect 
of that risk will be EXACTLY THE SAME. Ergo assuming that depositors insure 
themselves rather than being insured by taxpayers, banks are not funded any more 
cheaply when funded by entirely by depositors as distinct from entirely by 
shareholders. 
The only difference between those two scenarios is as follows. When depositors do 
the funding, and assets of the lending entity fall in value far enough relative to the 
value of liabilities (say assets fall to X% of liabilities)  the entity is declared insolvent 
and depositors get about X pence in the pound. In contrast, when shareholders do 
the funding and assets fall  to X% of liabilities (if one can call shares a liability), all 
that happens is that the value of the shares fall to about X pence in the pound. 
So what is achieved by having lending entities funded by depositors? All that is 
achieved is that the entity may go insolvent when it doesn’t need to: not much of an 
achievement.  
And indeed under Kotlikoff’s version of FR, incompetence by lending entities does 
not result in insolvency.  (Lehmans was a classic example: its liabilities never 
actually exceeded its assets – that is, it ran short of cash or encashable assets, not 
assets as such.) 
As George Selgin put it in his book on banking (Selgin (1988)) “For a balance sheet 
without debt liabilities, insolvency is ruled out…”. (Incidentally, that was an aside 
made by Selgin: his book did not actually advocate FR). 
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Incidentally there are other versions of FR, e.g. Milton Friedman’s, Positive Money’s 
and so on. But Kotlikoff’s is my preferred version, so I’ll stick with that. There are a 
few details on the different versions of FR in Endnote 2 below. 
  
Funding partly by deposits and partly by shares does not cut bank funding 
costs. 
 
Of course it is possible to have a bank or other lending entity funded PARTIALLY by 
depositors and partially by shareholders, and indeed that is a more usual 
arrangement. And in that scenario, and given serious problems, shareholders are 
wiped out before depositors. But that still has no effect on the TOTAL RISKS 
involved in running bank, as Messers Modigliani and Miller explained. There is 
therefore no effect on the total charge made by shareholders, depositors and any 
other bank funders for funding the bank. 
The Modigliani Miller theory (MM) has been criticised of course. But the criticisms 
are feeble. See this paper of mine, section 1.4 under the heading “Flawed Criticisms 
of Modigliani Miller.” Also Vickers devotes several paragraphs to MM, and suggests 
a few possible weaknesses in the theory, but does not seriously question it. 
To summarise so far, the liquidity produced by banks funded by depositors brings 
fragility with it (i.e. bank runs, and credit crunches).  But that liquidity is useless 
because liquidity / money can be produced by central banks at zero cost. Moreover, 
funding lending entities via depositors does not result in banks being funded any 
more cheaply than when they are funded by shareholders. Ergo having lending 
funded by depositors is pointless: it involves risk and brings no benefits.  
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Thus the best set up for the lending industry is one in which lending is funded just by 
shares, while money is produced only by central banks, and that is exactly what full 
reserve banking (a la Kotlikoff) consists of. (Incidentally, while as just pointed out 
there are different versions of FR, having just central banks issue money is a 
characteristic they all have in common) 
As to the central bank which issues money, that cannot fail either. 
 
The price paid for bank capital does not equal its real cost. 
 
Having said that there is no difference cost-wise between funding a bank via shares 
rather than deposits, bonds, etc, that is not quite how it works out in the real world, 
but that does not alter any of the above conclusions. 
For example the tax treatment of capital and deposits and other types of debt is 
different in the real world. But the answer to that is that tax is an ENTIRELY 
ARTIFICIAL imposition and should thus be ignored for the purposes of working out 
REAL COSTS AND BENEFITS, which are the important criteria here. 
Second, the cost of bank capital will currently doubtless be higher than the cost of 
debt because bank shareholders in the US have recently had to pay around $100bn 
in fines for sundry crimes committed by banks and for which shareholders were not 
responsible. Yes that’s billion, not  million. (The people ACTUALLY RESPONSIBLE, 
i.e. sundry bank executives have got off Scott free.) But that again is an entirely 
artificial imposition: it does not reflect REAL costs and benefits. 
As to the UK and other countries, similarly large fines have been born by bank 
shareholders. 
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Third, as capital ratios are raised, implicit subsidies are inevitably withdrawn. That is, 
and ignoring the fact that as capital ratios are raised the return demanded by 
shareholders declines because there are more shoulders to carry the risk, 
shareholders will want a bigger return when investing in a bank with a decent capital 
ratio as opposed to one where the ratio is ridiculously low and everyone knows that 
the risk is really being covered by taxpayers. But again, implicit subsidies are 
ENTRELY ARTIFICIAL: they do not represent REAL COSTS OR BENEFITS. 
 
Conclusion and summary of Part I. 
 
Maturity transformation achieves nothing. First, while it produces liquidity i.e .a form 
of money, it can only do so while also giving us bank fragility. Moreover, the liquidity 
or money issuing function can be performed by central banks at zero real cost. 
Second, having lending entities funded by depositors and bond-holders does not 
result in those entities being funded at any lower cost than where they are funded 
just by shareholders. Third, in the event of problems and where lending entities are 
funded just by shareholders, there is no need to close down lending entities. And 
having just shareholders fund lending entities is what Kotlikoff’s version of full 
reserve banking amounts to. 
And finally, exactly that policy is being imposed on money market mutual funds in the 
US at the time of writing. That is, funds which invest in anything other than 
government securities and base money will not be allowed to promise not to break 
the buck. (See Weiner (2014) and SEC (2014). In short, FR is being imposed on 
money market mutual funds in the US, which very much calls into question any 
claims that FR is not workable or practical. 
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Part II. Narrow / full reserve banking. 
 
The above paragraphs explained the flaws in the existing banking system and the 
flaws in MT and suggested that FR is a better system. Vickers’s objections to FR are 
now considered. 
Vickers actually uses the phrase “narrow banking” rather than “full reserve banking”, 
but his definition of narrow banking (his p.15) amounts to the same thing as for 
example Werner’s “full reserve banking” (Werner (2011)). It also comes to the same 
thing as Milton Friedman’s “100% reserve” banking (Friedman (1960, Ch3 and 
1965), and Laurence Kotlikoff’s “limited purpose banking” . I’ll use the phrase “full 
reserve” (FR). 
Vickers’s definition of FR (his “narrow banking”) and his criticisms of it are as follows.  
“So-called ‘narrow banking’ is the idea that the basic services of deposit-taking and 
payment  systems should be separated from other, inherently risky, banking 
activities by a  requirement that deposits are fully backed by safe liquid assets. This 
idea faces several problems. First, as the crisis has underlined, even government 
bonds are not necessarily safe liquid assets. Second, despite large government 
debts, there might not be enough government bonds to back retail deposits, 
especially of short- to medium-term maturity.  Third, narrow banking could lead to a 
very inefficient misallocation of resources. Natural holders of government bonds 
such as pension funds would find them in short supply, while credit in the economy 
was deprived of a prime funding source – deposits. Narrow banking would also lose 
the natural synergy that exists between deposit-taking and the provision of overdraft 
facilities. Fourth, deposit-taking and payments systems are not the only banking 
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services for which continuous provision is essential; the same is true of some credit 
supply, which would happen outside the narrow bank. So narrow banking, despite 
entailing large economic costs, would not address a major part of the problem.”   
 
1. Safety of government debt. 
 
I’ll take those points in turn. The first point (to repeat) was: 
“First, as the crisis has underlined, even government bonds are not necessarily safe 
liquid assets.”  
The answer to that is as follows. 
There have of course been numerous governments throughout history which have 
defaulted on their debts. But if you live in that sort of country then obviously it is not 
wise to put your life savings into government bonds:  better to keep your savings 
under the mattress or in the form of gold or a more trustworthy currency. 
However, the “ring fencing” system which the Vickers commission advocated was 
based on the assumption that UK citizens are not living in some sort of Greece or 
Zimbabwe: it was based on the assumption that the UK government CAN BE 
TRUSTED. So Vickers cannot claim that government might be IRRESPONSIBLE 
when it comes to FR: that is not a fair comparison between the existing banking 
system (enhanced or not by Vickers’s ring fence proposals) and FR. 
 
2. Not enough government debt? 
 
Vicker’s next criticism in the above passage was thus. 
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“Second, despite large government debts, there might not be enough government 
bonds to back retail deposits, especially of short to medium-term maturity.”   
The answer to that is that the above mentioned advocates of FR (Werner, Kotlikoff, 
etc) do not basically argue that safe accounts under FR should be backed by 
government debt. They advocated that it should be backed by base money. Or put 
another way, they advocated that where people want total safety (or something as 
near total safety as is possible in this world) the relevant money should be lodged at 
the central bank or be backed by base money. 
However, government debt, short term debt in particular is very similar in nature to 
base money. That is, short term government debt is simply a promise by government 
to pay the holder of the debt some base money in the near future. And Milton 
Friedman (1960, Ch3) and other advocates of FR have indeed argued that SOME of 
the money which people want to be totally safe should be put into short term 
government debt. But if there is not enough (or indeed ANY) of such debt, that is not 
a big problem for FR because, to repeat, most advocates of FR argue that money in 
the safe half of the banking industry should be backed by base money, with backing 
in the form of government debt being an optional extra. 
Another weakness in Vickers’s claim that shortage of government debt / bonds is a 
problem is that it is not entirely clear that government borrowing makes any sense at 
all. Certainly Milton Friedman argued for the abolition of government debt (Friedman 
(1948), see para starting “Under the proposal..”). Mosler (2010) argued likewise (see 
his second last paragraph). And Kellerman (2006) also questioned the logic of 
government debt.  
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So the “shortage” of government debt / bonds which Vickers claims to be a potential 
problem for FR, it not a problem at all. Indeed FR could function perfectly well where 
there is no government debt at all. 
Of course that scenario would mean that those wanting their money lodged in a 
totally safe manner would get no interest (assuming government does not pay 
interest on reserves / base money). But my answer to that is “tough luck”. In 
particular, there is no obligation on one set of people to provide a form of saving that 
pays interest just because some other set of people want same. Moreover, people 
with large amounts of cash to spare are the better off, while it’s the average taxpayer 
who effectively pays the interest. Thus the mere fact of paying interest on reserves 
tends to increase inequalities. And finally it is arguably a bit of a cheek to demand 
total safety AND INTEREST. Reason is that interest can only be earned by lending 
out or investing money, and lending or investing money is never an entirely safe 
activity. 
Put another way, if any given set of people want a profitable form of investment, and 
none is available, then it’s up to that set of people to create their own form of profit 
yielding investment: perhaps building houses to let. 
 
Not enough base money? 
 
Also, in connection with Vickers’s above point about there possibly not being 
“enough government bonds” to meet demand, that point could be extended to base 
money. That is, since base money and short term government debt are so similar, 
those of a “Vickers” persuasion might argue that by the same token, a shortage of 
base money might arise. 
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In fact it wouldn’t because given an increased demand for base money, the state 
would just have to create about the quantity demanded. Put another way, if the 
private sector won’t spend at a rate that brings full employment unless it is supplied 
with some given quantity of base money / government debt, then government just 
has to supply that base money / government debt if government wants to bring about 
full employment.  
The latter point is nicely illustrated in Japan. The Japanese have a high propensity to 
save, or to be more accurate to save government bonds and/or base money. The 
result is that the Japanese government IS FORCED is issue a relatively large 
amount of debt. (Japanese government debt stands at over 200% of GDP). 
But that is not to suggest that the supply of base money will EXACTLY equal 
demand on an hour by hour basis. However, any significant disparities between 
supply and demand can always be dealt with by manipulating interest rates, 
including having interest rates at a small negative level when appropriate. Also 
banks can maintain THEIR OWN stock of reserves / base money, and allocate some 
of that to customers when customers demand same. 
Incidentally, the idea that the state is forced to supply whatever amount of debt 
and/or base money the private sector wants is widely accepted in Modern Monetary 
Theory circles.  
To summarise, Vickers’s fears about there not being enough government bonds are 
unfounded and for the following reasons. 1, there is no obligation on the state or any 
set of individuals to supply interest yielding bonds in the quantity wanted by savers. 
2, in contrast, the state IS FORCED to supply whatever amount of base money the 
private sector (pension funds included) wants, but that “supply” would happen more 
or less automatically under any sort of well run government. 
17 
 
 
3. Allocation of resources. 
 
Vickers’s third point in the above passage is thus. 
“Third, narrow banking could lead to a very inefficient misallocation of resources. 
Natural holders of government bonds such as pension funds would find them in short 
supply, while credit in the economy was deprived of a prime funding source – 
deposits. Narrow banking would also lose the natural synergy that exists between 
deposit-taking and the provision of overdraft facilities.”  
As readers will doubtless notice, that point is a bit of a repetition of the second point 
dealt with above. But never mind: there is actually another point that can be made 
against Vickers’s “shortage” claim and as follows. 
Why does a shortage of government debt mean a “very inefficient misallocation of 
resources”? If demand for stock exchange shares exceeds supply, no one complains 
about a “misallocation of resources”. All that happens is that the normal laws of 
supply and demand kick in and the Dow or FTSE rises. Likewise, if there is 
increased demand for government debt, then its price rises and interest rates fall. As 
to why falling interest rates should be a big problem, Vickers does not tell us. 
Moreover, there is yet another option for pension funds experiencing a shortage of 
government debt, and that is not to invest at all: they can always move towards an 
“investment free” system, that is a pay as you go system. The biggest pension 
system in the UK, the state pension system, is pay as you go, as are a proportion of 
private pension systems. 
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Deposits are a source of credit? 
 
Vickers’s next claim in his above third point is that separating deposit accepting from 
lending means the economy is deprived of a source of credit. That’s the passage 
which runs 
 “credit in the economy was deprived of a prime funding source – deposits.” 
What actually happens on converting to FR is that depositors have a choice. Either 
they can have their money lodged in a totally safe manner, in which case it is not 
loaned on, i.e. it is not used as a “funding source” (except perhaps being loaned to 
government).  Alternatively, they can have some or all their money loaned on, i.e. 
used as a “funding source” or source of “credit”, but THEY THEMSELVES carry the 
risk if incompetent loans are made instead of taxpayers carrying the risk. 
Now it is hard to see what is wrong with that especially since the Vickers commission 
and other regulators (to repeat) disapproved of subsidies for the private banking 
industry, and quite right. Subsidies misallocate resources, as explained in the 
economics text books, and result in reduced GDP. 
Plus under FR there is no need for savers to take any significant risks in order to 
earn interest. That is, under FR savers have A CHOICE as to what to put their 
money into. If they want to put it into conservative mortgages (i.e. mortgages where 
mortgagors have a minimum 20% or so equity stake) they can. The chance of losing 
money on that sort of investment is vanishingly small.  
To summarise, converting to FR does not, as claimed by Vickers result in borrowers 
being denied a “source of funding”. What happens is that they are funded, but on a 
commercial basis, rather than a subsidised basis. 
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Obviously that would result in a finite rise in interest rates (and a decline in total 
debts). But interest paid by mortgagors in the UK in the 1980s was up to THREE 
TIMES what they pay nowadays. That did not result in a widespread homelessness 
or an inability to buy houses.  Plus economic growth was far better in the 1980s than 
during the last five years during which we have enjoyed the dubious benefits of very 
low interest rates. 
Of course a SUDDEN rise in interest rates is best avoided, but a significant and 
SLOW RISE would do no harm. 
Another point which weakens Vickers’s claim about lenders being starved of funds is 
that he claimed a few sentences earlier that pension funds under FR would be 
SHORT OF ways of investing their funds.  
 
Should deposits fund loans? 
 
The next phrase in Vickers’s above third point is thus. 
“Narrow banking would also lose the natural synergy that exists between deposit-
taking and the provision of overdraft facilities.” 
That phrase, again, rather repeats a point already made by Vickers when he said 
“credit in the economy was deprived of a prime funding source – deposits” (a 
sentence dealt with above). However there is an additional point to be made in 
connection with those two sentences, as follows. 
A problem with that claim is that it begs one of the BASIC QUESTIONS addressed 
by and solved by FR, which is thus. 
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Using deposits to fund loans means by definition that banks have liabilities that are 
FIXED IN VALUE and assets that can fall in value (when incompetent loans are 
made). And that is asking for trouble: indeed the world experienced several trillion 
dollars of “trouble” during the last five years. That is trillions of dollars of public 
money had to be used to deal with the consequences of the above risks involve in 
having deposits (and bonds) fund loans. In other words it is precisely the fact of 
funding loans via deposits rather than via shares that gives us bank “fragility”, to use 
Douglas Diamond’s phraseology. 
FR solves that problem by having bank SHAREHOLDERS fund loans rather than 
depositors or bond holders. 
Let’s leave the last word on that to the economics Nobel Laureate, James Tobin: 
“The linking of deposit money and commercial banking is an accident of history…” 
 
4. Continuous provision of loans. 
 
Vickers fourth criticism of FR is thus. 
“Fourth, deposit-taking and payments systems are not the only banking services for 
which continuous provision is essential; the same is true of some credit supply, 
which would happen outside the narrow bank. So narrow banking, despite entailing 
large economic costs, would not address a major part of the problem.”   
The first answer to that is the only reason the EXISTING BANKING SYSTEM 
managed to “continuously provide credit” over the last five years or so was thanks to 
trillions of dollars of assistance in the form of public money.  
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In contrast, under FR, the half of the banking industry that lends just CANNOT go 
insolvent (if it is funded entirely by shareholders).  
Nevertheless, it is legitimate to ask what would happen under FR in the scenario that 
played out around five years go, that is where banks suddenly found their loans / 
assets were worth much less than book value. 
Well the answer is, first, that on finding that bank or lending entity’s assets are worth 
say X% less than book value, the price of those banks’ shares would drop to about 
X% of their initial value. Or in the case of Kotlikoff’s system, the value of stakes in 
relevant mutual funds would drop to X% of initial price. 
Second, banks / lending entities would realise their lending activities had been over-
optimistic, thus they’d cut down on lending (in exactly the same way as any business 
contracts its operations when it realises it has over-estimated what it can sell). But 
there’d be absolutely no reason for banks to cease lending altogether. That is, as 
loans were repaid, they’d tend to use that money to lend to obviously credit worthy 
customers. Indeed, that is more or less what happened during the recent crisis: 
banks reduced their lending. 
The big difference of course is that it required billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money 
to keep banks lending at that reduced rate during the crises, whereas under FR, 
there’d be no need for one penny of taxpayer support because, to repeat, it’s plain 
impossible for a bank to go insolvent under FR.  Instead of taxpayers taking a hit, 
bank shareholders take a hit if they sell out during the above sort of crisis. Of course 
if those shareholders hang on for a year or two, their shares might recover in value. 
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Would introducing full reserve banking reduce aggregate demand? 
 
A final possible criticism of FR to be considered here (not one made by Vickers) is 
thus. As pointed out just above, when FR is introduced, depositors have a choice of 
having their money lodged in an entirely safe manner or alternatively they can have it 
loaned on to mortgagors, businesses, and so on, but those depositors themselves 
carry the risk involved. 
Now if we assume that the state does nothing with the money that is lodged in a 
totally safe manner, rather than use it to fund extra state owned investments, then 
the effect would be to reduce demand and raise unemployment. However, that is no 
problem because demand can be raised any time by standard stimulatory measures: 
interest rate cuts, an increased deficit, quantitative easing, and so on. 
 
______ 
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Endnote 1. Liquidity creation by commercial banks. 
As explained in the main text, if lending entities are funded just by shares, that 
reduces the amount of MT or money creation done by those entities, and some form 
of compensatory money creation would probably be required. The private or 
commercial bank system can actually do that, and as follows. 
With a view to obtaining day to day transaction money as distinct from getting a loan, 
anyone can have any amount of money credited to their account by a bank by 
depositing enough collateral. If they don’t have collateral, they’ll still be able to get 
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day to day transaction money, but will have to pay more interest, perhaps the 
extortionate rates charged by pay day lenders. By way of a simple example, suppose 
everyone has £Z credited to their account. 
Assuming that money is used just for day to day transaction purposes, the balance 
on everyone’s account will fall below £Z and rise above £Z several times a year, but 
ON AVERAGE over the year the balance will be £Z. Thus no long term loan takes 
place. In short, money can be created when the existing or fractional reserve 
banking system makes loans, but the reverse does not apply. That is the existing 
banking system can issue or create money without any long term loans being 
granted. 
Put another way, there is a distinction in principle between the creation of day to day 
transaction money and granting long term loans, though of course those two 
activities get mixed up in the real world. 
 
Endnote 2. Different versions of FR. 
As pointed out in the main text above, Kotlikoff’s verson of FR involves lending 
entities being funded just by shareholders. In contrast, there is Milton Friedman’s 
version. In Ch3 of Friedman’s book “A Program for Monetary Stability” he says 
(under the heading “How 100% reserves would work”): 
“The effect of this proposal would be to require our present commercial banks to 
divide themselves into two separate institutions. One would be a purely depository 
institution, a literal warehouse for money. It would accept deposits payable on 
demand or transferable by check…….The other institution that would be formed 
would be an investment trust or brokerage firm. It would acquire capital by selling 
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shares or debentures and would use the capital to make loans or acquire 
investments. Since it would have no power to create or destroy money, monetary 
considerations would not demand any special control over its activities.” 
Note that Friedman contemplates funding lending entities via “debentures” (i.e. 
bonds). As explained in the main text, that has the problem that it means such 
entities can go insolvent.  
The same goes for the Werner / Positive Money’s version of FR. That version 
involves those who want their money loaned on putting their money into a special 
investment account at their bank. Those depositor / savers are promised £X back for 
every £X deposited which as is explained in the main text above, makes the lending 
entity vulnerable and to no great benefit.  
Of course of course given a depositor to shareholder ratio of say 50:50, the chances 
of depositors losing money is vanishingly small. However, there are still arguments 
for a 100% rather than 50% capital ratio and as follows. 
First there are no costs involved in raising the ratio to 100% and for reasons spelled 
out by Modigliani and Miller. And second, 100% is a clear line in the sand. In 
contrast, anything less will increase the chances of bankers lobbying for a gradual 
reduction of that ratio back down to the ludicrous 3% or so that prevailed before the 
recent crisis. (Irving Fisher (1936) made a similar point about clear lines in the sand: 
see his paragraph starting “Furthermore, the 100% plan…”.) 
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Endnote 3. How commercial banks create money. 
Where someone buys shares in a lending entity worth £Y and that money is loaned 
on, no money creation takes place. 
In contrast, where someone DEPOSITS £Y at a bank / lending entity, and that 
money is loaned on, the borrower has £Y, but the depositor also regards him/herself 
as being the proud owner of £Y. Hey presto: £Y has been turned into £2Y. Money 
has been created out of thin air. 
 
Endnote 4. If MT is so useless, why do banks do it? 
Having poured cold water on MT above, the fact remains that commercial banks do 
MT, and it is a not bad assumption that where something takes place in a free 
market, that may well be beneficial (though of course there are glaring exceptions to 
that rule). At any rate, the above question merits an answer, and the answer is thus. 
Banks are in competition with each other. And with a view to attracting funds, banks 
make impressive claims as to the safety of any funds attracted. Indeed, they take it 
to the point of claiming that anyone depositing £X is absolutely guaranteed to get £X 
back (maybe plus interest and maybe less bank charges). However that claim is 
fraudulent because banks lend or invest on sums deposited, and there is no such 
thing as a totally safe set of loans or investments. (I’m assuming a pre-1930 free 
market scenario where bank bail outs were unheard of). 
In contrast, if banks said to depositors something like “we’ll do our best to return your 
money, but there are not absolute guarantees”, that would be more honest. But that 
would turn those deposits into something resembling shares. But that is precisely 
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what is advocated here: funding lending entities via shares rather than “guaranteed 
to get your money back” deposits. 
_____________ 
